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EDITORIAL
In the issue of March, 1930, The Jour
of Accountancy discussed at
some length a decision then recently
handed down by Justice Holmes of the supreme court of the
United States in the case of the Haberle Crystal Springs
Brewing Company. This was an income-tax case, and the
court decided that the taxpayer was not entitled in computing
its taxable net income in the years 1918 and 1919 to a deduc
tion for obsolescence of its goodwill resulting from the adoption
of the eighteenth amendment. In this case the amount of
the deduction was not at issue. The amount had been legally
established, if any deduction whatever was to be allowed. The
government contended that the revenue act of 1918 intended to
allow for the exhaustion, wear and tear and obsolescence of prop
erty of such a nature that it was decreased, consumed or disposed
of by use in the trade or business, and that goodwill is not such
property. The court in its decision did not refer to the govern
ment’s contention but decided against the taxpayer on the
ground that the words “exhaustion” and “obsolescence” did
not apply when a business was terminated by law as an evil, and
that to make such an allowance would be to grant part compen
sation to the taxpayer for the extinguishment of his business by
law in the form of an abatement of taxes otherwise due, and that
it was incredible that congress should have intended such a result.
The effect of this decision was to reverse, upon a point which had
never been urged or argued before the court, a practice which had
been followed by the government since 1919 and in accordance
with which probably ninety-five per cent. of all the cases which
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could arise as a result of the prohibition amendment had been
settled and the tax paid. Aside from this practical aspect of
the matter, the decision has not commanded the universal respect
that we should wish for the decisions of our highest court.
Now the supreme court has handed
down a decision, in V. Loewers Gambrinus Brewery Company v. Charles W.
Anderson (U. S. supreme court, No. 352, February 24,1931), which
confirms the right of the taxpayer in calculating its taxes for 1918
and 1919 to deduct an allowance “for obsolescence of its buildings
resulting from the imminence and taking effect of the prohibitory
laws.” In its decision in this case, which is one of three some
what similar cases decided at the same time, the court endeavors
to distinguish between obsolescence of tangible and intangible
property, although the language of the revenue act of 1918 [sec
tion 234 (a)] speaks only of “property used in the trade or busi
ness.” It is satisfactory to note in this decision that the supreme
court definitely affirms the ruling of the treasury, which allowed
taxpayers engaged in brewing, distilling, etc., when computing
their taxable net income to spread their allowance for obsolescence
due to prohibition over the period from the date when the
imminence of prohibition became definitely known until prohi
bition became effective; that is, the period between January 31,
1918, and January 16, 1920. The court also recognized that
there is nothing in the language of the statute—that is, the revenue
act of 1918—or the circumstances of its enactment to suggest that
congress intended that the taxable incomes of brewers should
not be determined according to the rules that govern taxable
incomes of others. The court also states: ‘‘ None of the acts made
any classification based on the causes from which obsolescence
results. And, as the sole purpose is to arrive at the net income
subject to taxation, it is clear that such a discrimination could
not reasonably or justly be made.”

Supreme Court Now
Allows Deduction

The language of the Gambrinus decision
gives considerable ground for a belief
that should a case now arise presenting a
claim for allowance of the exhaustion or obsolescence of intangi
ble property, the court would find difficulty in refusing a decision
in favor of the taxpayer. Let us suppose, for instance, that in the
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year 1914 a brewing or a distillery company had paid the sum of
$1,000,000 for a trade name, a trade brand or a process. Fol
lowing the language of the 1918 statute there would seem to be
no doubt that through this transaction the corporation would
have acquired “property” and that that property would have
been destroyed by the prohibition legislation. Under the ordi
nary rules for computing taxable net income the loss on property
can be deducted in the year in which the exhaustion or obsoles
cence occurs, and the supreme court now confirms the treasury
rule adopted in 1919 allowing taxpayers whose property is
destroyed by prohibition legislation to spread this deduction
over a total period of nearly two years. The Haberle Crystal
Springs case involved goodwill rather than a trade name, brand
or process, but had a company in the year 1914 paid a substan
tial sum for the goodwill of the Haberle Crystal Springs
Brewing Company, it would seem to the lay mind that the
taxpayer would be entitled to deduct the amount which
it actually paid in the purchase of such property. In the Gambrinus case the court has cleared away some difficulties and has
supported the treasury ruling under which, as already stated, a
large majority of the possible cases arising under prohibition
legislation has been settled. Its decision, however, seems to entail
a conflict with the court’s own decision in the Haberle Crystal
Springs case. It has decided that the allowable deduction for
exhaustion or obsolescence of intangible properties may be spread
over a period during which the coming into effect of prohibition
was definitely known. The statute uses the word “property”
without any qualification. The Haberle Crystal Springs case
did not deny a deduction for obsolescence on the ground that the
property in that case was an intangible property. What position
the court would take in a new case presenting squarely the issue
of the exhaustion or obsolescence of intangible property is an
interesting speculation.
Since publication of an editorial note
The Bidding Question
in the March issue of The Journal of
Reviewed
Accountancy upon the subject of com
petitive bidding for accounting engagements, several letters have
been received from correspondents agreeing and some disagreeing
with the policy expressed. Those who feel that the position taken
was wrong base their contention upon the statement that it seems
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to be impossible to obtain certain kinds of engagements in any
other way. For example, in some places it is the custom, possibly
even the law, to call for bids for the audit of savings banks and
similar institutions. Consequently, say the correspondents, the
accountant is compelled to bid and it is useless to oppose what is
compulsory. That is strange logic. What we were trying to say
in the earlier comment was that if accountants would refrain
from bidding a wiser method would have to be evolved. Suppose
it is the law that there shall be bids for the audit of a savings
bank and suppose that no one bids—what then? No ac
countant really feels that bidding is satisfactory, especially if it is
bidding a flat fee. As we have said repeatedly the chances of
bidding a flat fee which will be exactly fair are so remote as to be
out of the range of vision. If the bid is too low the accountant
loses, and if it is too high the client loses, and it is certain to be
either too low or too high. Consequently we find that it must be
unfair to some one and, being unfair, we fail to see how anyone
can defend it.
The Plea of
Competition

Another basis of opposition to the view
which we have expressed is described
as the "local conditions." One account

ant writes:
“You must remember that in this territory an amount over
whelmingly in excess of one-half of the business is in the hands
of accountants who have no professional affiliation and have no
compunctions about competitive bidding. I had one personal
experience this winter. Having performed the work in 1930, I
was willing to make a flat bid of $1000, but at the same time I had
a feeling that it would take careful management to make the reg
ular rates at that price. One of the firms to which I allude se
cured the work on a bid of $600. I believe it may become neces
sary for the council to suspend certain of the rules in designated
territories, in order that members may compete with non-members with a fair chance of success.”

Those are noble sentiments. Because there are conditions in
some parts of the country which afflict the reputable accountant
and because unprofessional practices may seem profitable in
those districts, our correspondent seems to advocate the abandon
ment of decency for participation in a free-for-all fight. The
man who wrote that letter does not really mean what he says and
he would not be guilty of doing half the things he threatens to do,
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but his remarks are interesting if only for the purpose of discus
sion. Carried to their extreme his views would involve the break
ing down of all law, all morals, all civilization. If there is no
higher guiding principle than jungle law why should we struggle
upward? If the public interest is sacrificed to personal desire,
avarice, lust or hate is that a reason why all should follow? Is it
not rather the most potent reason why all should not follow? If
there are so-called accountants who do reprehensible things, is
that to be the standard of the profession? Of course it is easy to
generalize and it must be admitted that the competitive tactics of
accountants who would compete are distressing, but it is im
possible to avoid a feeling that the man who has not sufficient
backbone and inherent ability to succeed even in the face of
competition and low practices is in the wrong vocation. The
profession as a whole marches upward and the man who wrote
the letter which we are discussing would fight furiously if anyone
should suggest that he fall out of line.
A reader, who has been studying rates of
depreciation of physical assets, has been
considerably disturbed by the sub
stantial difference which he has found in what he calls the
theoretical depreciation compared with the actual extent of de
preciation based upon appraisal. For example he points to a
circular issued by an appraisal company containing a statement of
depreciation of machinery at fifteen years’ life shown theoretically
as fifty per cent. but by appraisal as only thirty per cent. There
are other comparisons somewhat similar, and our correspondent
feels that there may be serious misunderstanding of the compara
tive values of theoretical and actual depreciation. Now, as a
matter of fact, there will always be a wide difference of opinion as
to the valuation of any wasting asset at any given time. For
example, one may buy a piece of machinery estimated to have a
life of twenty years. During that period of twenty years there
may be no change in mechanics which will tend to render obsolete
the machinery in question. By extraordinary care the machinery
may be maintained in absolutely sound condition. The market
prices of machinery may advance. In such circumstances an ap
praisal of the machinery at the end of twenty years might show
that there had been no depreciation whatever—and it is conceivable
that because of market conditions there might be appreciation.
245
Depreciation Vari
ously Computed

The Journal of Accountancy
Is such an extraordinary incident to invalidate the theory of
depreciation? It is absolutely ridiculous to attempt to lay down
a uniform rate of depreciation which will apply fairly to every
piece of machinery in the world. So-called actual depreciation is,
therefore, merely the decline in value of one item during a given
period, and it may or may not serve as an index to the average
depreciation of all such items. Theoretical depreciation, on the
other hand, is a composite of the estimated decline in value of a
number of articles of similar nature. It is, of course, never ac
curate, or if it be accurate no one can know it. We should regard
it as most unhealthy for any company engaged in an industry
involving the use of machinery, for example, to base its estimate of
depreciation upon a condition reported by another concern rather
than upon a general line of depreciation found to be close to the
average. Certainly it would be bad accounting to carry such
sensitive assets as machinery in the books at a figure substantially
higher than the theoretical value determined as a result of experi
ence in many plants. Every owner of wasting assets knows the
temptation to over-valuation. When a bad year comes—for in
stance such a year as 1930—it is very easy to say, “ Really we have
been writing off too much depreciation in past years and we
shall omit any reserve or allowance this time.” That is self-decep
tion which may lead to disaster. More businesses have gone to
the wall because of failure to recognize depreciation than for any
other reason. Depreciation in times of depression is bitter
medicine but good for one’s soul.

The United States Daily in its issue of
January 30, 1931, reports a decision
of the supreme court of Delaware in a
case involving the payment of accrued preferred dividends on dis
solution of a company. The case is of peculiar interest because
of the questions of rights involved. In the opinion of the court
it was stated: “The company having been organized a number of
years had both common and preferred stock outstanding. The
company had not been successful and at no time had there been
any net profits arising from its operation nor at any time did it
have a surplus over capital and liabilities.’’ Of the three ques
tions presented in the appeal, most important is the third which
the court describes as follows: “In dissolution proceedings where
there was not and never had been any surplus or net profits, can
246
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unpaid dividends on preferred stock, agreed to be cumulative, be
given preference to payments on common stock in addition to
the preference of the par value of the stock?” Article four of
the certificate of incorporation provided as follows: “In the event
of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the corporation,
or upon any distribution of its capital, other than the redemp
tion of its preferred stock, the holders of the preferred stock shall
be entitled to be paid in full the par value thereof and all unpaid
dividends accrued thereon, before any amount shall be paid or
any assets distributed to the holders of the common shares, and,
after the payment to the holders of the preferred stock of the
amount payable to them as hereinbefore provided, the remaining
assets and funds of the corporation shall be divided and paid to
the holders of the common shares according to their respective
shares.”
The opinion of the court reads in part as follows:

“We shall now address ourselves to the remaining and more
important question presented by this appeal. This question is,
in brief: Are the preferred stockholders entitled, in dissolution
proceedings, to a preference in the payment of dividends in addi
tion to the par value of the preferred stock where the assets of the
company do not include profits from its management?
“ If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the further
question then arises: To what point of time are the unpaid divi
dends computed? The chancellor determined that since no
profits or surplus existed, no dividends on the preferred stock
could have accrued, and, therefore, no unpaid dividends could
be given preference in the dissolution proceedings. The remain
ing question as to the computation of the time of preference of
such unpaid dividends was, of course, not considered by him.
“This court does not agree with the conclusion reached by
the chancellor, and in view of the importance of the ques
tion with relation to the corporate structures under the laws
of this state, we have given the matter both serious and special
consideration.
“The consideration of the rights of holders of preferred stock
of the corporation in question to dividends is largely covered by
paragraphs (a) and (e) of the articles of the certificate of incor
poration. These paragraphs cover fields entirely different.
Paragraph (a) treats solely of the rights of preferred stockholders
to dividends while the company is a going concern. Of course,
the right to dividends in such a case depends upon the existence
of surplus or net profits. This requirement is not only expressly
set out in paragraph (a), but is also fundamental in the law of
corporations.
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“Paragraph (e), however, has no relation to the company as a
going concern; it contemplates only the relation of stockholders
inter se after all creditors have been paid and the remaining assets
of the corporation are distributable to the stockholders. There
is no legal requirement aside from contract as set out in the certifi
cate of incorporation that in dissolution proceedings accumulated
dividends could only be preferred from surplus or profits.
“In other words, it is universally conceded that the certificate
of incorporation could provide, if it was clearly and unequivocally
therein stated, that in dissolution proceedings the holders of
preferred stock would be entitled to a preference of accumulated
unpaid dividends before payments to common stockholders even
though no surplus or profits existed. It is, therefore, true that the
non-existence of profits creates no legal barrier to the preference
of dividends in dissolution proceedings.
“The question is then one solely of contract between the stock
holders. What did the stockholders mean when, in contemplat
ing dissolution proceedings, after the payment of debts, they
stipulated that the preferred stockholders should have a return of
the par value of their stock together with unpaid dividends
accrued thereon?
“We are, . . . , of the opinion that in the present case the
holders of the cumulative preferred stock are entitled in the
liquidation proceedings to be paid in addition to the par value
of their stock the unpaid dividends accrued thereon.
“The question then arises: To what point are these dividends
payable? Are they payable to the time of the appointment of
the receiver or down to the time of distribution?
“We are clearly of the opinion that it was only contemplated
that the preferred stock would be entitled to dividends while the
company was a going and active concern and while it was possible
to produce that fund from which it was originally thought the
dividends would be paid, viz., the surplus and profits of the com
pany. No dividends could have been contemplated as becoming
due after the company ceased to have any profits from its man
agement, and when the management itself was taken from the
officers and vested in the court through the instrumentality of the
receiver then the liability for dividends ceased. (Drewry-Hughes
Co. v. Throckmorton; Johnson v. Johnson & Briggs; In re Creditors
Oil Co., L. R. 1902, 2 Ch. 86).”
Every year the question of the use and
destination of an accountant’s report
becomes increasingly important. In
far too many cases the accountant seems to feel that having
delivered his report he may wash his hands of the whole matter
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and let the use of the report depend upon the whim of the client.
Possibly under a strictly legal definition of duty it is not neces
sary for the accountant to give any consideration at all to what
the client or any other person may do with his report when it has
been rendered and payment for it has been made, but that is a
narrow view and one which may lead to serious injury to client,
accountant and banker. The accountant may say that he is not
concerned with any misuse, but that is not true. He is concerned
deeply. The case is admirably summarized in the following
letter from a member of the American Institute of Accountants
addressed to that organization:
"Among my clients there are several who desire an account
ing service consisting of only the preparation of periodical reports
from their books, advice concerning accounting problems asapplied to their business and the preparation of various tax returns.
I assume that other accountants also have clients who desire nei
ther a balance-sheet nor complete audit, and who would, there
fore, fall in the same general class.
"When rendering a report on an engagement of this nature, the
qualification ‘This balance-sheet is subject to the accompanying
comments ’ is always stated upon the balance-sheet itself, and the
comments include the following sentence:
‘“In accordance with the terms of my engagement, no audit of
the accounts or verification of assets has been made.’
“Of course a report of this kind is not certified.
“Many clients falling in this class borrow at various banks and
are requested to file financial statements showing their condition.
These statements are usually prepared by the clients on the
bank’s own form. Many of these forms contain the query, ‘Are
your books audited by a C. P. A. ? If so, by whom and as of what
date?’
“On repeat engagements of the type mentioned, I have on oc
casions seen, among papers submitted to me, a copy of such a
financial statement made to the banks and found in some cases
that the client had answered the question regarding audit in the
affirmative, giving my name as being the auditor, despite the
qualification contained in my report. Usually these statements
agree with the balance-sheet prepared by me from the books of
account.
“While this condition is far from being ideal, I have always
felt that if the banks accepted the client’s statement without re
questing a signed copy of the auditor’s report, the negligence was
on their part.
“However, I have found on a recent engagement, that a state
ment prepared by my client and filed at the bank with the above
query answered in the affirmative showed amounts greatly in
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excess of the figures submitted in my unaudited report. For in
stance, the inventory was stated to the bank at about $56,000
more than the inventory as per the books of my client, and a con
siderable amount of real estate owned by the proprietor but not
recorded on the books was also shown in the financial statement.
The bank to which this statement was sent is one of the largest
financial institutions in an adjoining county, and, so far as I know,
has accepted the statement for credit purposes, since it is extend
ing the client a line of credit, relying possibly on the statement
therein contained that the books have been audited by me.
“Such a condition is certainly unfavorable to the auditor, and
the cooperation of the banks should be sought to end such an un
fair practice on the part of fraudulent clients.
“What redress has an accountant in a case of this kind, and
what are the steps that can be taken to prevent its recurrence?
It seems to me that if the banks in every case in which they re
ceive a financial statement purporting to have been audited by a
C. P. A. would insist upon receiving a signed copy of the account
ant’s report it would certainly be to their advantage and would
also be very desirable from the accountant’s viewpoint for his pro
tection.
“I can not, I assume, go to the bankers in question and tell
them that their customer has filed a fraudulent statement. Never
theless, if this client meets with financial difficulty and the bank
ers suffer a loss, they would undoubtedly look with suspicion on
any balance-sheets which may be submitted to them in the future,
bearing my certificate, as I have no doubt they are under the im
pression that the figures contained in the financial statement they
are using for credit purposes are authentic and prepared by me.
“This is a question which I think warrants the Institute’s at
tention and I raise it for discussion because of the particular case
cited, at the same time seeking advice as to what might be done
to protect my own reputation. Would I be justified, in the cir
cumstances, in writing to all bankers in this vicinity advising
them that in all cases in which they receive statements from their
clients which contain my name as auditor, I disclaim responsi
bility unless signed by me, or unless a copy of my report covering
the engagement in question is duly signed and filed with them?”
The correspondent asks what can be
done to prevent such fraudulent prac
tices as that of which he complains.
It seems that there are several things which can be done. In
the first place, if the accountant has the slightest reason to believe
that his client is one who would be guilty of perpetrating such a
crime as that which he describes, he should refuse the client’s
work. Any borrower who would present a fraudulent statement
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to a bank is a bad client. Every bad client, even if he pays his
bill, is a serious liability to the accountant. Without going
into the question of law it certainly appears that the courts would
have jurisdiction over a man who would commit such an inten
tional wrong. There has been far too much tendency to play
fast and loose with accountants’ reports. In some cases they
have been actually distorted, in others essential figures have
been omitted, and in others there has been merely a general
assertion of the fact of audit without any details of the results of
audit. Accountants will argue, of course, that they can not foresee
what a client will do with a report, but in a great many cases the
accountant may have a fairly indicative premonition. Some
accountants have adopted the expedient of printing upon each
sheet of paper a legend to the effect that the report must not be
used in any way except in its entirety. This would not meet the
case of the client who simply referred to the fact of audit. There
is no objection, however, to the adoption of this printed formula
and in some instances it may be protective.
The second thing which can be done to
prevent undesirable use of accountants’
reports is an effort to educate the banker
and to teach him not only to ask for audited statements but to
read them when they are submitted. Some years ago letters of
inquiry were sent to a number of prominent bankers in a great
city asking what attention was paid to the details of the state
ments submitted by borrowers. To the utter astonishment of
nearly everyone, several bankers admitted that they did not read
even the accountant’s certificate and were interested merely in
the name of the accountant. If they knew the name and re
spected it that was sufficient. In other words, if a well-known
accounting firm were to certify that the accounts of Blank and
Company were incomplete, false or misleading and that the com
pany was insolvent, the banker would not be interested in that
part of the certificate but would turn merely to the name of the
signer and conclude that all was well with Blank and Company.
Can anyone conceive such utter stupidity? And yet that is
what some bankers themselves admitted. Of course most
bankers are of a different breed but there are some who can
not bother with detail. The suggestion of the correspondent
that he should write to every bank in the vicinity warning all

Education Always
Needed
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bankers that he disclaimed responsibility except when the full
report was presented does not seem to be a feasible proposal.
In all probability some of his letters would not be read. A
banker who will not read an audit certificate will certainly not
read a letter.
It is always pleasant to be able to
mention the activities of accountants
which bring them into touch with
national and public affairs. Only last month we had occasion
to refer to this subject and we are able to return to it this month.
Year by year the accomplishments of the profession become
more and more important to the world. The work which is
done by public accountants is not measurable in terms of money
and much of the most important accomplishment is brought about
simply by the desire to serve. As an illustration of the increas
ingly significant part which accountants are playing, it is interest
ing and gratifying to read in the daily papers that Robert H.
Montgomery of New York has been appointed executive
secretary of the commission to take profits from war. This
commission, whose work is timely and gives promise of great
importance, consists of the secretaries of war, the navy, agricul
ture, commerce and labor, the attorney-general, Senators Reed,
Vandenberg, Robinson and Swanson and Representatives Hadley
of Washington, Holaday of Illinois, Collins of Mississippi and
McSwain of South Carolina.

Accountants in
Public Life

As we come up out of the valley of the
shadow of depression begins a time of
wider vision. We are all convinced that the worst is past and
that better days are close at hand. Indeed, most of the bitterness
of the past months has been fear of a shadow. Business may not
be greatly improved, but the fear is passing and many are able to
see through the shadow to the sunlight. One of these people of
vision writes, “I believe that you have as great an admiration for
Isaiah as I have. Last night I happened to be reading the
sixth and seventh verses of the forty-first chapter. Has it oc
curred to you that these would make a most suitable text for an
editorial or essay?” Now as it is barely possible that one or
two of our readers may not remember the exact language of the
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King James version of these two verses, and as they can not be
trite even if known by heart, let us quote them:

“They helped everyone his neighbor; and everyone said to his
brother, Be of good courage.
“So the carpenter encouraged the goldsmith, and he that
smootheth with the hammer him that smote the anvil saying,
It is ready for the sodering: and he fastened it with nails, that it
should not be moved.”
Commentators tell us that these verses really apply to the pro
cedure of idol-making, but commentators are a troublesome
folk. Most of us like to take these two splendid examples of
English and interpret them as we will for a chronicle of brother
hood. At any rate whatever be the meaning in the original, it
would be a magnificent thing for all of us to adopt the
principle involved in the sixth verse at least and help everyone
his neighbor and say everyone to his brother “Be of good courage.”
Really there is cause for encouragement.
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